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The Effects of Trial Judge Gender and
Public Opinion
on Criminal Sentencing Decisions
ChristinaL. Boyd*
Michael J. Nelson**
We explore the effects of a trial judge's gender in criminal
sentencing decisions by addressing two unsettled questions. First, do
female and male trial judges sentence criminal offenders differently
from one another? While numerous qualitative and quantitative
scholars have examined this question, the results lack consistency.
Second, are female trial judges' sentencing practices differentially
affected by public opinion compared to male judges' behavior? Little
research exists on this second question, but existing theory on how
females and males make decisions and operate as judges is informative.
To provide new empirical insight into these questions, we rely on
two sources of data:judge sentences stemming from Colorado trial court
marijuana-relateddrug cases filed from 2004 to 2009 and local public
opinion on marijuanafrom a 2006 Colorado general election initiative
on whether to legalize marijuanapossession. These data permit us to
analyze judges' baseline sentencing practices (pre-2006 initiative) and
the effect that public opinion has on the sentences (pre- vs. post-2006
initiative). The statistical modeling indicates that while male and
female judges in Colorado generally do not sentence defendants
differently from one another, there is one exception. Namely, female
judges are more lenient than male judges when sentencing female
defendants. Our empirical results also indicate that while Colorado trial
judges were responsive to local public opinion following the 2006
*
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excellent feedback from the Symposium participants. We are grateful to the Colorado judicial
branch for providing the data and answering questions about them.
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marijuanainitiative, that responsiveness was not more potent for female
judges than it was for male judges. Together, these empirical results
provide important new insights into the behavior of male and female
trial courtjudges.
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INTRODUCTION
"State trial judges have a great deal of authority and discretion
over criminal prosecutions."' What a judge does with that authority and
discretion in criminal cases-including plea bargains, bench trials,
evidentiary motions, the content of jury instructions, and sentencingis likely to depend greatly on the judge's background, preferences, and
biases. 2 Moreover, most state trial judges are selected and/or retained
through elections, meaning that there is a direct connection to and
constraint from the public as well. 3 In other words, the identity of the
trial judge and the local culture in which she operates are almost
certainly important in determining criminal case outcomes and rulings.
We turn our focus to how one particular judicial characteristica judge's sex-might affect judicial behavior in criminal defendant
sentencing decisions. In isolation, the fact that female and male judges
1.

TRACEY E. GEORGE

&ALBERT H. YooN, AM.

CONSTITUTION SoC'Y FOR LAW & Policy, THE

GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 12, http://gavelgap.org/pdflgavel-gap-

report.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2017) [https://perma.ccl67RE-AJ58].
&

2.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); LEE EPSTEIN
JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-10 (1998); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 312-403 (2002).

3.
E.g., Michael J. Nelson, Uncontested and Unaccountable? Contestation Rates in Trial
Court Elections, 94 JUDICATURE 208, 210 (2011).
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may sentence criminal defendants differently from one another has
critical implications. As George and Yoon report, gender
representativeness on state courts is low. 4 As a result, a defendant's
likelihood of drawing a female judge is greatly affected. This, in turn,
can systematically lead to disproportionately lenient or harsh
sentencing of defendants. New empirical analysis can help provide
insight into the severity of this concern.
We also consider if and how a trial judge's sex intersects with
public opinion pressures. Elected judges generally fear being viewed as
"soft on crime,"5 particularly when their electorate has directly spoken
on the issue through a ballot initiative. 6 While it may be that all elected
judges-male and female-equally fear the public's wrath, female
judges may be particularly likely to seek voter approval and consensus
in their criminal sentencing behavior. Once again, we look to empirical
analysis to provide the answer.
We examine differences in responsiveness to public opinion
among male and female judges through a study of trial court sentencing
in marijuana cases in Colorado. In 2006, voters in Colorado rejected a
proposed constitutional amendment that would have legalized the
possession of small amounts of marijuana, leaving the legal status quo
but providing local judges with constituency-specific information about
the public's views toward marijuana legalization. With this unique vote,
we have access to a constituency-level measure of public opinion on an
issue that regularly comes before trial court judges and was publicly
available to those judges as part of the normal process of reporting vote
totals. This vote, therefore, sidesteps issues with measuring local-level
public opinion that have plagued earlier studies, enabling us to assess
responsiveness to public opinion with a measure of public opinion that
is both valid and of particular relevance to elected judges, since it
represents the views of those citizens who actually do turn out on
election day.
In what follows, we tackle these questions in order. In Part I, we
examine the behavior of female and male judges in sentencing criminal
defendants. This includes an exploration of the theory and prior
empirical analyses in this area, an overview of the empirical research

4.

GEORGE & YOON, supra note 1, at 8.

5.
Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens United, Television
Advertising and State Supreme Court Justices'Decisions in Criminal Cases, SKEWED JUSTICE,
http://skewedjustice.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cclVR5D-78XT].
6.
James H. Kuklinski & John E. Stanga, Political Participation and Government
Responsiveness: The Behavior of CaliforniaSuperior Courts, 73 AM. POL. Sol. REV. 1090, 1090-91
(1979); Michael J. Nelson, Responsive Justice? Retention Elections, Prosecutors, and Public
Opinion, 2 J.L. & CTS. 117, 123-24 (2014).
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design, and a presentation of our empirical results. In Part II, we
continue with our dual examination of whether public opinion has a
differential effect on male and female judges in their sentencing
decisions. This begins with a general background on the effects of public
opinion on judicial behavior followed by a more specific theoretical
exploration of the judge gender-public opinion question. We then turn
to a discussion of our data and research design and conclude with our
original empirical analysis and findings. Finally, in our Conclusion, we
discuss the implications of our findings for criminal defendants, state
trial court judging, and future research in this area.
I. GENDERED JUDGING AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING

We begin our examination of whether male and female judges
behave differently when sentencing criminal defendants by first
detailing the theoretical arguments and prior empirical efforts on the
subject. We then turn to an original empirical analysis.
A. A Female Judge Difference in Sentencing?
Scholars frequently study the question of whether female judges
behave differently from male judges. The reasons are clear. A judiciary
with a composition that descriptively represents society's makeup "has
a positive legitimizing effect on the functioning of a democracy."7
Additionally, representative courts help to ensure that our laws are
interpreted "by judges who can understand the circumstances of the
communities which they serve."8 Moreover, if male and female judges
behave differently from one another while serving on the bench,
important effects on judicial outputs may result. As Boyd argues:
Judges, and particularly trial judges, are well positioned to affect their assigned cases and
the way that they progress. This has tremendous implications in trial courts for outcomes,
settlements, costs, appeals, the distribution of resources after a case, and even the
decision of litigants to file their cases and seek adjudicated remedies at all. In short, if
diverse trial judges behave differently from their colleagues, we should expect substantive
9
differences in the outputs of the judiciary.

Numerous theoretical accounts have emerged to explain if,
when, and why female judges will behave differently from their male

7.
Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversificationof the Federal Bench: Policy
and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 597 (1985).
GEORGE & YOON, supranote 1, at 3.
8.
9.
Christina L. Boyd, Representation on the Courts? The Effects of Trial Judges' Sex and
Race, 69 POL. RES. Q. 788, 789 (2016).

2017]

TRLAL JUDGE GENDER

1823

colleagues. Notable accounts include different voice,10 informational,"
representational, 1 2 and organizational theories.1 3 Each theory has been
thoroughly discussed and debated in the literature (generally and as
applied to judging). 14
Empirical scholarship looking for gender-based results in
judging behavior in appellate courts has been relatively uniform in its
findings that judicial gender matters, but generally only in cases
involving women's issues, like employment-based sexual discrimination
and sexual harassment. 15 On the trial court side, however, much less
empirical consensus exists. Recent trial court work has highlighted the
need to focus on individual issue areas and a variety of judge decisions
beyond those published in the Federal Supplement or analogous state
outlets when testing for the presence of a judge-gender effect. 16
What about trial judge behavior in criminal cases, particularly
the sentences handed down by trial court judges? Does a judge's gender
systematically affect outcomes in these judicial decisions?1 7 The
10. Gilligan's different voice theory argues that males and females have distinct worldviews.
Under this theory, males are committed to masculinity, logic, and justice, and females tend to
value obligations, relationships, and personal communication. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1993). As applied to judging, the

different voice theory expects that these female-specific values affect female judges' decisions
across "all aspects of society, whether or not they affect men and women differently." Suzanna
Sherry, The Genderof Judges, 4 LAW & INEQ. 159, 160 (1986).
11. Under this theory, female judges bring unique knowledge and experience to the bench
based on their shared professional backgrounds. See, e.g., Gerard Gryski et al., Models of State
High Court Decision Making in Sex Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143, 145 (1986).
12. Under the representational theory, female judges make decisions to advance their
interests and liberate other women. Beverly B. Cook, Will Women Judges Make a Difference in
Women's Legal Rights? A Predictionfrom Attitudes and Simulated Behaviour, in WOMEN, POWER,
AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS 216, 217 (Margherita Rendel ed., 1981).

13. Organizational theory asserts that all judges undergo the same professional training and
experience before joining the bench and rely on the same laws and norms while making decisions.
See Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of Judge and
Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition, 14 SOC. SCI. J. 77, 86 (1977).
14. See Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 389, 390-91 (2010), for a review of the literature and empirical studies.
15.

Id. at 389; see, e.g., SUSAN B. HAIRE & LAURA P. MOYER, DIVERSITY MATITERS: JUDICIAL

POLICY MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 34-35 (2015); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro,
Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel
Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 300 (2004); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges
Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmakingin the FederalAppellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759,
1761 (2005); Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996 (June 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago) (on file with author).
16. Boyd, supra note 9, at 791.
17. Prior research highlights the high degree of prosecutorial discretion, including in making
sentencing recommendations to judges. See, e.g., Nancy King, Commentary, Three Directions for
Future Research into Sentencing Discretion, 30 JUST. Q. 223 (2013). Future empirical projects
should seek to examine whether prosecutors behave differently and make different sentencing
recommendations before male and female judges.
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empirical research here continues the trend of other trial court-judicial
diversity studies: it is a hodgepodge of findings. While some scholars
find that there is little to no difference between male and female judge
behavior in trying or sentencing defendants,1 8 a nontrivial number of
studies in recent years have found that female judges are more punitive
than male judges when deciding these cases 19 or that female judges are
more lenient than male judges when deciding these cases. 20
One explanation for the current state of the empirical criminal
trial court-judge gender literature may lie with the disparities present
in the underlying theoretical accounts and their expectations for female
judges deciding criminal cases. For some issue areas, like sexual
discrimination or harassment cases, three of the four notable
theoretical accounts consistently expect female judges to behave
differently from male judges. 21 These accounts may vary in the
underlying explanation of why a difference is expected, but the
empirical implications are the same. By contrast, when considering
judicial decisionmaking in criminal cases, the theoretical accounts are
less optimistic in predicting a female judge effect. There is no reason to
expect that female judges uniformly possess unique and valuable
information about criminal cases (the informational account). As in
other circumstances, the organizational account of judging continues to
expect no differences among female and male judge behavior. Indeed, it
is only the different voice account of judging that might anticipate
different outcomes in criminal cases for all defendants based on the
presiding judge's sex. Recall that this theory's "feminine perspective" to
18. E.g., David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL
STUD. 347, 372-73 (2012); Richard Fox & Robert Van Sickel, Gender Dynamics and Judicial
Behavior in Criminal Trial Courts: An Exploratory Study, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 261, 271 (2000); Claire
S.H. Lim et al., Do Judges' CharacteristicsMatter? Ethnicity, Gender, and Partisanshipin Texas
State Trial Courts, 18 AM. L. & EcON. REV. 302, 305 (2016); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1377, 1453-54 (1998).

19. Lim et al., supra note 18; Cassia Spohn, Decision Making in Sexual Assault Cases: Do
Black and Female Judges Make a Difference?, 2 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 83, 94 (1990); Darrell
Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge's Gender Affect the
Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SoC. FORCES 1163, 1181 (1999); Lydia Tiede et al.,
JudicialAttributes and Sentencing-Deviation Cases: Do Sex, Race, and Politics Matter?, 31 JUST.
Sys. J. 249, 263-64 (2010); see also Fox & Van Sickel, supra note 18, at 270.
20. Brian D. Johnson, Judges on Trial: A Reexamination of Judicial Race and Gender Effects
Across Modes of Conviction, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 159, 174 (2014); Kenneth L. Manning,
,C6mo Decide?: Decision-Making by Latino Judges in the Federal Courts, Paper Presented at 2004
Midwest
Political
Science
Association
Annual
Meeting
(Apr.
15,
2004),http://citation.allacademic.commeta/p-mlaapa-researchcitation/0/8/3/3/9/pages83393/p8
3393-1.php [https://perma.cc/2A9H-DSRQ]. In related work, Bryna Bogoch, Judging in a 'Different
Voice': Gender and the Sentencing of Violent Offenses in Israel, 27 INTL J. Soc. L. 51, 62-65 (1999),
finds that female Israeli trial judges are more lenient in their sentencing behavior.
21. In particular, different voice, representational, and informational theories predict this.
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judging "encompasses all aspects of society." 22 In the context of criminal
law, different voice theory would likely predict that "women's emphasis
on caring and their recognition of the importance of relationships would
be expressed in a therapeutic rather than a punitive model." 23 A more
conditional prediction yields from the representational account of
judging. Here, female judges are expected to behave in ways designed
to protect the interests of women more broadly. In the context of
criminal sentencing, this is likely to result in more lenient sentences,
but only for female defendants.
Another potential explanation for the mixed bag of criminal trial
court-judge gender findings may rest with previous data limitations.
While a number of studies have tackled this topic, the same small set
of data sources continue to be utilized. That has generally meant only
studying Pennsylvania trial courts, Texas trial courts, local city trial
courts, 2 4 or federal trial judge decisions published in the Federal
Supplement. Turning to new data sources may provide additional
insight.
B. Dataand Research Design
In this study, we seek to provide new empirical insight into the
question of whether female and male trial judges behave differently
from one another. To do this, we look to novel data from the Colorado
state trial courts. 25 Our data are unique in two major ways. First, unlike
many prior studies of sentencing, which examine all criminal cases or
violent crimes, we confine our analysis to marijuana cases, a set of cases
about which the public has broadly differing views. Whereas there is
broad public agreement that violent crime should be punished, the
public differs widely about the appropriateness of criminalizing
marijuana use and possession. Second, we are able to tie this sample of
marijuana cases to a unique vote, explained below, that provided judges
with information about their constituents' opinions on marijuana.
Colorado has a two-tiered trial court system: county courts and
district courts. Each county has its own county court (64 in total). The
counties are also grouped into 22 judicial districts, with each judicial
district housing a district court. There is some jurisdictional overlap
between the two types of trial courts, but the district courts generally

22. Sherry, supra note 10, at 160.
23. Bogoch, supra note 20, at 68.
24. John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM. SCI. 308,
311-12 (1981) (studying "Metro City" felonies); Spohn, supra note 19, at 88 (studying Detroit
Recorder's Court cases).
25. Nelson, supranote 6, at 118.
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hear the more severe cases. 26 County and district trial judges are
initially selected for a two-year term, via merit criteria, through a
commission process. 27 Thereafter, the judges face uncontestable
retention elections. Subsequently, the judges face similar retention
elections at the end of each four-year (for county court judges) or sixyear (for district court judges) term.2 8
We focus on the 2,589 cases decided in 2004 and 2005 in
Colorado county and district courts alleging a violation of Colorado's
prohibition on the usage of marijuana. 29 The data for this study come
from records kept by the Colorado judicial branch. 30
We test for a gender effect in sentencing in three ways. First, we
analyze the full set of sentences handed down by Colorado trial court
judges, using as our dependent variable a traditional sentence severity
scale developed by the United States Bureau of Justice. 31 The scale
assigns point values to different types of sentences. For example, fines
and unsupervised probation receive zero points. A sentence of
supervised probation is worth one point if it is less than one year in
length, two points if it is between one and three years in length, and
four points if it is over three years in length. Similarly, a prison
sentence of less than one month is worth one point, while a prison
sentence of seven to twelve months is worth five points. 32 The measure
is facially valid, declining in value with the severity of the charge: the
average value of this variable for felonies, misdemeanors, and petty
offenses, respectively, is 12.06, 7.01, and 3.71.
Second, for a more intuitive metric of sentence severity, we
subset the data into only the most severe sentences. Examining only
felonies, we model the number of days of incarceration in the sentence
received by the defendant. Because this variable is highly skewed, we

26.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 212351, STATE COURT

ORGANIZATION 2004, at 273 (2006).
27. Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts, Am.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y (2013), http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/JudicialSelection
Charts_1196376173077.pdf [https://perma.cclK2BB-WDQP].
28. Id.
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-406 (2016), amended by 2017 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 401 (titled
"Offenses relating to marijuana and marijuana concentrate").
30. The data analyzed do not include any cases from the city of Denver. The data received
from the Colorado judicial branch do not include cases heard by the Denver County Courts. These
courts are under the purview of the city of Denver and not the Colorado judicial branch.
31. This is the same scale used by Nelson, supra note 6, at 142. For other uses of this scale,
see Beverly B. Cook, Public Opinion and Federal Judicial Policy, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 567, 572
(1977); James L. Gibson, Judges'Role Orientations,Attitudes, and Decisions:An InteractiveModel,
72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911, 913 (1978); and Herbert M. Kritzer, FederalJudges and Their Political
Environments: The Influence of Public Opinion, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194, 205 (1979).
32. For the full scale, see Nelson, supra note 6, at 142.

2017]

TRIAL JUDGE GENDER

1827

follow standard practice and use as the dependent variable ln(1 + Days
of Incarceration). 33
Finally, we examine the least severe sentences in the data-the
petty offenses-separately. As Nelson notes, such an examination has
the benefit of examining the class of offenders who are least likely to
have a prior criminal record, thereby offering some insurance against
the inability of the other statistical analyses to control for variation in
the defendant's prior criminal record. 34 Here, we take a similar strategy
to that used for the felonies, modeling ln(1 + Fine Levied) as the
dependent variable.
Our primary independent variable for this study is the
sentencing judge's sex. Coded using the judges' first names, this
variable is measured 1 for female judges and 0 for male judges. The
data contain sentences handed down by 106 male judges and 40 female
judges.
We also control for a variety of political and legal factors that
may affect a judge's behavior when sentencing a defendant. For
example, trial judges may be swayed in their decisionmaking by the
public's overwhelming liberal (or conservative) tendencieS 35 or their
own ideological proclivities. 36 To measure the public's ideological
position, we include the percentage of the vote won by the Democratic
candidate in the closest U.S. presidential election (Constituent
Ideology). To capture the judge's ideological position, we include
another variable (Republican) to indicate whether the judge was
appointed by a Republican (= 1) or a Democratic governor (= 0).37 The
predictions from both political variables are straightforward: judges
with more conservative constituencies and judges appointed by
Republican governors should sentence defendants more harshly in
marijuana cases.
Turning to legal factors that may affect judicial behavior in these
sentencing cases, we include indicator variables for the severity of the

33. Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on
Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. Sl. 107, 130 (2007).
34. Nelson, supranote 6, at 146.
35. We explore in detail below why public opinion may affect judicial behavior in these cases.
Note, however, that prior to 2006, Colorado state judges had little direct and specific information
on how their local publics felt about marijuana-related issues.
36. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supranote 2, at 86-111 (detailing how judicial ideology affects
judicial behavior).
37. It would have been ideal to have judicial-ideology measures similar to Lee Epstein et al.,
The JudicialCommon Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306-10 (2007), or the PAJID scores created
by Paul Brace et al., Measuringthe Preferencesof State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387, 398
(2000). However, no such measure exists for local-level state actors.

1828

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol.70:6:1819

offense: felony, misdemeanor, or petty. 38 We also control for whether the
case was heard by a district court or a county court. We also account for
important defendant characteristics, including age, gender, and
minority status. 39 We expect that younger, nonwhite, and male
defendants will, on average, receive higher sentences. 40 To determine
whether female judges sentence female defendants differently than
male defendants, we include a multiplicative interaction term between
the gender of the judge and the gender of the defendant. Sixteen percent
of the sentences in the data were given to female defendants. We model
the data using linear regressions with random intercepts for county and
judge. 41

C. Findings
Table 1 displays the results of all three linear regressions. The
first column of the table displays the model estimates for all sentences
using the sentence severity scale as the dependent variable. The second
column of the table models the amount of incarceration time received
by defendants convicted of felonies, and the final column of the table
models the amount of the fine received by defendants convicted of petty
offenses.
In all three models, the coefficient for female judge fails to attain
statistical significance. As such, the conclusion is clear: for the average
case, there is no evidence that male and female judges in Colorado
systematically sentence differently from one another. The average
defendant in our data is a twenty-four-year-old white male convicted of
a petty offense. For him, our results indicate that the predicted sentence
severity is 2.75 points when he is sentenced by a male judge and 2.58
points when he is sentenced by a female judge. 42

38. See, e.g., King, supra note 17, at 227, for a discussion on the need to differentiate
misdemeanors from other offenses. King notes that "[ojnly a small percentage of all misdemeanor
convictions result in an initial sentence to incarceration." Id.
39. This study does not control for the defendant's prior criminal history. Unfortunately, the
Colorado judicial system did not keep these records with their other rich data.
40. For more on the importance of defendant characteristics in the criminal justice system
and the case outcomes that emerge, see, e.g., Debra A. Curran, JudicialDiscretionand Defendant's
Sex, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 41, 54-56 (1983); Darrell Steffensmeier et al., The Interaction of Race,
Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male,
36 CRIMINOLOGY 763, 763-66, 788 (1998); and James D. Unnever et al., Race Differences in
Criminal Sentencing, 21 SOC. Q. 197, 204-05 (1980).
41. The data suggest substantively identical conclusions for a variety of other modeling
strategies, including negative binomial regressions.
42. These predictions are based on the estimates from Model 1, Table 1.
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TABLE 1: MODELING SENTENCE SEVERITY IN MARIJUANA

CONVICTIONS, COLORADO 2004-2005
All
Sentences

Constituent Ideology

District Court

Minority Defendant

Female Defendant

Misdemeanor

Petty Offense

Constant

0.15

(0.47)

(0.11)

-0.54*

-0.47

-0.20

(0.23)

(0.37)

(0.11)

0.00

0.01

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

0.00

-0.03

0.00

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.00)

0.23

2.33

-0.44*

(0.28)

(2.89)

(0.11)

0.48*

0.48

-0.02

(0.16)

(0.37)

(0.06)

0.03

-0.75*

-0.01

(0.15)

(0.43)

(0.06)

-4.80*

-

(0.19)

--

-8.00*

-

(0.26)

-

Defendant's Age

0.26

(0.27)

-

Republican Appointee

Petty
Offenses

-0.18

-

Female Judge

Felonies

11.74*

1.49

5.26*

(0.75)

(3.11)

(0.26)

GJudge

0.95

0.30

0.13

ODistrict

0.72

0.52

0.11

N

2589

379

1436

12928.80

1934.17

3485.42

BIC

Standard errors are in parentheses, and * indicates statistical significance at
p<0.05. Felonies are the baseline category in the first model (column 1).
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Female Defendant
Defendant's Age

Minority Defendant

Constituent Ideology

District Court

Republican Appointee

Misdemeanor

Petty Offense

Constant

-0.01

0.63

0.16

(0.27)

(0.50)

(0.11)

0.26

-0.17

0.01

(0.17)

(0.50)

(0.06)

-1.03*

-2.26*

-0.11

(0.36)

(0.98)

(0.14)

0.00

0.01

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

0.48*

0.50

-0.02

(0.16)

(0.36)

(0.06)

0.00

-0.03

0.00

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.01)

0.21

2.61

-0.44*

(0.28)

(2.88)

(0.11)

-0.52*

-0.45

-0.20

(0.23)

(0.37)

(0.11)

-4.80*
(0.19)

-

-8.02*

-

(0.26)

-

-

Female Judge x

Petty
Offenses

-

Female Defendant

Felonies

-

Female Judge

All
Sentences

-

TABLE 2: MODELING SENTENCE SEVERITY IN MARIJUANA
CONVICTIONS, COLORADO 2004-2005

11.73*

1.05

5.26*

(0.76)

(3.11)

(0.26)

OJudge

0.97

0.32

0.13

CDistrict

0.74

0.53

0.11

N

2589

379

1436

12928.52

1933.00

3494.15

BIC

Standard errors are in parentheses, and * indicates statistical significance at
p<0.05. Felonies are the baseline category in the first model (column 1).

There

The control variables behave inconsistently across models.
is some evidence that female defendants receive lighter
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sentences-about one year less-when convicted of felonies and that
nonwhite defendants receive harsher sentences (about half of a point on
the sentence severity scale) overall. Surprisingly, Republican-appointed
judges tend to sentence less punitively than judges appointed by
Democratic governors, though this effect is only statistically significant
in one model.
A follow-up question to ask of these data concerns the
representational effects of female judges; perhaps female defendants
are advantaged when they appear before a female judge because female
judges, on average, give lighter sentences to female defendants. To this
end, Table 2 replicates the models from Table 1, including a
multiplicative interaction term between the gender of the judge and the
gender of the defendant.
Both overall and in felony cases, the multiplicative interaction
term is statistically significant, providing some evidence of a
differential effect. However, the substantive effect is not readily
apparent from Table 2. To provide more insight into this substantive
effect, Figure 1 plots the marginal effects of judge and defendant gender
on sentence severity.
Looking first at all charges, Figure 1's marginal effect of being
sentenced by a female judge is 0.00 for male defendants. In other words,
male and female judges, all else equal, sentence male defendants
identically. Of course, this effect is not statistically significant. For
female defendants, the marginal effect of being sentenced by a female
judge is -1.03, or a full point less on the sentence severity scale. This
effect is statistically significant (p

= 0.01).43

From these analyses, we draw two major conclusions. First,
there is no evidence that male and female judges differ in their average
punitiveness. This is true for all charges as well as for the most and
least severe offenses. Second, strong evidence for a gendered effect in
sentencing emerges from a representational aspect: here, female judges
are significantly more lenient on female defendants than male judges.

43. For felonies specifically, the pattern is similar: the marginal effect of being sentenced by
a female judge is very close to zero for male defendants but is larger and negative, accounting for
a difference of about one year of incarceration, for female defendants. The marginal effect of this
difference is statistically significant at the p = 0.09 level.
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FIGURE 1: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF JUDGE AND DEFENDANT GENDER ON
SENTENCE SEVERITY
Icted Sentence Severity

Female Defendant
Male Defendant

o
0

Female Defendant
Male Defendant

o
0

Sentence Severity Scale

This figure displays predicted values of sentence severity for combinations of defendant
and judge sex. The model estimates come from Model 1 in Table 2 and hold all other
covariates at their median (for interval-level variables) or modal (for categorical
variables) values. The modal charge type is a petty offense. The figure demonstrates
that female judges sentencing female defendants tend to give the lightest sentences.

II. GENDERED JUDICIAL RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION?

Using the above baseline for the judicial behavior of male and
female trial judges in criminal sentencing cases, we now assess whether
male and female judges respond differently to signals about their
constituents' opinions. In what follows, we discuss the general
connection between public opinion and judicial behavior and whether
this effect is likely to be stronger for female judges than male judges.
We then turn to an empirical test of this potential effect on Colorado
state trial judges.
A. Public Opinion and JudicialBehavior
Federal and state judges are affected by public opinion,
regardless of the institution used to select or retain them. At the federal
level, where judges will never directly face the electorate, scholars have
argued that judges attempt to follow public opinion to bolster their
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legitimacy. 44 These studies generally assess the extent to which the
liberal or conservative nature of court outcomes coincide with changes
in the general ideological leanings of the public.4 5
At the state level, there is an even stronger judicial connection
to the public. The vast majority of state judges face voters to retain their
positions on the bench.46 This creates a strong electoral connection and
attendant incentive to remain alert to and follow public opinion.
Scholars of the state judiciary have found that elected judges are
generally responsive to the people in their state. 47 This is true even in
states where judges are retained using uncontestable retention
elections.4 8
While judges' individual decisions in cases are generally hidden
from widespread public scrutiny, there is still reason to believe that the
public's preferences will constrain judicial behavior. Within
congressional elections and legislative politics, where incumbents have
at least a 90% chance of reelection, scholars argue that the mere
possibility of electoral defeat colors nearly every action that legislators
take. 49 The same is true for judicial elections. Interest groups organize
44. See Bryan Calvin et al., On the Relationship Between Public Opinion and Decisionmaking
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 64 POL. RES. Q. 736, 743 (2011); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin,
Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We're Not Sure Why), 13 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 280 (2010); Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme
Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 468, 49294 (1997); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least DangerousBranch Revisited: New
Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1023 (2004).
45. See Calvin et al., supra note 44, at 739; Epstein & Martin, supra note 44, at 271-72;
Flemming & Wood, supra note 44, at 472-74; McGuire & Stimson, supra note 44, at 1027-28.
46. Nelson, supra note 3, at 209.
47. See, e.g., Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the
Practice of Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL. Scl. 360, 370 (2008). Notably, however, the type of
judicial retention institution used conditions the magnitude of the effect. See, for example, Richard
P. Caldarone et al., PartisanLabels and DemocraticAccountability: An Analysis of State Supreme
Court Abortion Decisions, 71 J. POL. 560, 571 (2009), which finds that judges retained through
nonpartisan elections are more likely than partisan-elected judges to issue abortion decisions that
comport with public opinion.
48. See Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., JudicialIndependence and Retention Elections, 28 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 211, 229 (2012) (demonstrating that, in abortion cases, retention elections induce a
responsiveness to public opinion similar to that experienced by judges in contestable elections);
Carol Ann Traut & Craig F. Emmert, Expanding the IntegratedModel of JudicialDecision Making:
The CaliforniaJustices and Capital Punishment, 60 J. POL. 1166, 1176-79 (1998) (finding that
public opinion plays a role in California Supreme Court justices' death penalty decisions even
though those judges face uncontested retention elections). For state trial courts, trial court judges
retained through uncontestable retention elections are generalizable to most trial judges in
partisan and nonpartisan contested election states. See, for example, Nelson, supra note 3, at 212,
which indicates that state trial judges (on courts of general jurisdiction) in these states rarely face
a challenger in their primary or general elections.
49. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed. 2004)
(asserting that politicians are primarily motivated by the goal of reelection); R. Douglas Arnold,
Can Inattentive Citizens Control Their Elected Representatives?, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 401,
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campaigns against judicial retention or reelection.5 0 Judges are aware
when their colleagues are not retained and, in response, are more
cognizant of the political environment in their future behavior. 51
When it comes to crime-related issues, the public-judicial
behavior connection is particularly strong. Baum has argued that
"creating the impression that a judge is soft on crime can have great
electoral impact." 52 Shepherd and Kang similarly assert that "[a]t the
margin, whether consciously or unconsciously, [elected judges] prefer to
avoid a judicial vote in a criminal case that can be the basis for attack
advertisements funded by independent expenditures." 53 Hall has
similarly asserted that "[i]n judicial elections, arguably the most
important policy focus for voters is crime." 5 4 Why might this be the case?
By their very nature, criminal cases are "brought in the name of the
government on behalf of the community."5 5 In other words, these cases
place the mass public and the shared values of society on trial.
The empirical evidence supports this constraint. Hall finds that
state supreme court justices overturn fewer death penalty sentences
when the murder rate is high.5 6 When it comes to trial court judicial
sentencing practices, previous work finds a strong public opinion
constraint. Huber and Gordon find that, as the date of their retention
election approaches, Pennsylvania judges hand down more punitive
sentences.57 Similarly, Berdejo and Yuchtman demonstrate that
Washington state trial court judges who stand for contestable
nonpartisan elections issue sentences that are around 10% longer at the

411-15 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993) (arguing that, due to a fear
of electoral retribution, legislators consider the potential preferences of even inattentive voters).
50. See Nelson, supra note 6, at 122 (noting that interest groups may inform voters about a
judge's unpopular decisions even in uncontested elections); Roy A. Schotland, Iowa's 2010 Judicial
Election: Appropriate Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118, 119-20 (2011)
(outlining the increase in interest group spending aimed at informing voters about a controversial
judicial decision made by judges who face retention elections).
51. James L. Gibson, Environmental Constraints on the Behavior of Judges: A
RepresentationalModel of Judicial Decision Making, 14 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 343, 365-67 (1980)
(asserting that judges who had previously been defeated in an election were more receptive to
environmental influences).
52. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and JudicialIndependence: The Voter's Perspective,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 35 (2003).
53. Shepherd & Kang, supra note 5.
54. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probingthe Myths of
Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 315, 322 (2001).
55.
1996).

STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2 (5th ed.

56. Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the
American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 497 (1995).
57. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind
When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 255 (2004).
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end of a judge's term than at the beginning.5 8 Kuklinski and Stanga find
that the sentencing behavior of California trial court judges changed
drastically after a failed 1972 marijuana legalization initiative in the
state.5 9 Much more recently, Nelson finds that Colorado state trial
judges adjusted their sentencing behavior in response to local public
opinion about marijuana revealed by a 2006 legalization initiative in
the state. 60
While theory leads us to expect that elected judges should reflect
public opinion in their decisions, they can only do so to the extent that
they know what that public opinion actually is. In the absence of local
(e.g., county) polling data, judges must look to other sources. Nelson
describes judges' typical alternative sources for this information and
their inherent limitations:
Through conversations with friends, colleagues, the local bar association, and the alleged
criminals with whom they work, judges and prosecutors gather some information about
how their geographic constituents feel about issues. Still, while they may try to ascertain
their constituents' preferences by talking to their friends and neighbors, they risk the
chance that those individuals are a homogeneous segment of their constituency with a
61
biased view of overall constituency opinion.

On rare occasions-such as those leveraged in the Kuklinksi and
Stanga study 62 using 1972 California data, or the Nelson study 63 using
the 2006 Colorado data-judges have high-quality, widely available
local precinct public opinion information to rely on. In these situations,
judges' quests to follow public opinion are undoubtedly eased and
improved.

58. Carlos Berdejo & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of
PoliticalCycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 741, 742 (2013).
59. Kuklinski & Stanga, supranote 6, at 1093. Kuklinski and Stanga compare the aggregate
sentences produced by each California county's superior court before and after the 1972 initiative.
They find that courts whose constituents favored the legalization of marijuana sentenced
defendants more leniently than the other trial courts. Id.
60. Nelson, supra note 6, at 118. Like Kukhnski and Stanga, supra note 6, at 1091, Nelson's
study utilizes a failed marijuana legalization initiative to provide a strong, issue-specific signal of
public preferences. Nelson, supra note 6, at 126. Unlike Kuklinski and Stanga, supra note 6, at
1092, Nelson's data provide judge-level voting behavior rather than more aggregated and noisy
court-level statistics. Nelson, supra note 6, at 136.
61. Nelson, supra note 6, at 123-24.
62. Kuklinski & Stanga, supranote 6, at 1091.
63. Nelson, supra note 6, at 126.
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B. A Gendered Connection Between Public Opinion and Judicial
Behavior?
To our knowledge, little prior empirical work assesses whether
similarly situated female and male elites respond differently to public
opinion. Given the importance of public opinion to judges, as described
above, we believe this is an oversight in need of remedy. We see two
related theoretical avenues that may anticipate that female judges will
be more likely than their male counterparts to court the public's favor.
First, female judges may be more likely to actively seek approval
and acceptance from voters than male judges. Previous work finds that
females are more likely to adopt democratic management styles, while
males favor autocratic ones. 64 In the context of studying federal district
court judges, Boyd argues that
a female style of management is characterized by a decision-making environment that is
more likely to encourage participation among subordinates, democratic communication,
collaboration, consensus building, and the drawing of multiple voices into deliberative
processes.... Conversely, a traditional male style of management is one that disfavors
this type of participative environment and instead sees the male decision maker seizing
65
opportunities to exercise his authority over outcomes.

While these gender-specific styles are most likely to manifest
themselves when judges are in leadership and management positions,
like serving as a court's chief judge or managing a trial court case, they
may also emerge more broadly. In other words, female judges may be
more likely to seek democratic consensus in their behavior (via public
opinion), whereas male judges may prefer to "exercise their authority"
over a decision by following their own preferences to the exclusion or
limitation of public opinion's influence.
Second, a bevy of research studies find that females are
frequently devalued in job application and evaluation processes
compared to equally qualified men. 6 6 This work indicates, for example,
that "evaluators may subtly shift the criteria they use to make hiring
decisions to benefit gender or race typical applicants."6 7 These studies
64. Alice H. Eagly & Blair T. Johnson, Gender and Leadership Style: A Meta-analysis, 108
PSYCHOL. BULL. 233, 236 (1990).
65. Christina L. Boyd, She'll Settle It?, 1 J.L. & CTS. 193, 196-97 (2013) (citations omitted)
(citing Eagly & Johnson, supra note 64; Judy B. Rosener, Ways Women Lead, 68 HARV. Bus. REV.
119 (1990); Cindy Simon Rosenthal, Determinantsof CollaborativeLeadership:Civic Engagement,
Gender or OrganizationalNorms?, 51 POL. RES. Q. 847 (1998)).
66. E.g., Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward
Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573 (2002); Madeline E. Heilman & Michelle C. Haynes, No
Credit Where Credit Is Due: Attributional Rationalization of Women's Success in Male-Female
Teams, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 905 (2005).
67. Julie E. Phelan et al., Competent Yet Out in the Cold: Shifting Criteriafor HiringReflect
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 32 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 406, 407 (2008).
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also find that "when both the in-group [here, males] and out-group
[here, females] are assessed on the same criteria, discrimination that
favors the in-group is likely," 68 and that "status stereotypes often result
in diminished expectations of competence" for women and racial
minorities. 6 9 Among other settings, this gender-specific bias has been
known to materialize in elections. Sanbonmatsu finds that voters rely
on "stereotypes about men and women in society" to develop voting
preferences. 70
In the face of this potential evaluation bias among voters, elected
female judges may double their efforts (or "jump through more hoops" 71
to prove their judicial capabilities and avoid failure at the ballot box.
This exceptional female effort can result in many different types of
judicial outputs. One such output may be that female judges are more
cognizant of public opinion. In the context of uncontested retention trial
court elections, this may lead female trial judges to be more attentive
to the public's preferences than their male colleagues. And, in the face
of strong evidence of those preferences, they may be more responsive to
those preferences in their decisionmaking behavior.
Despite these pro-difference explanations, there are plenty of
reasons to expect that, all other things equal, male and female judges
will be equally responsive to public opinion pressures. One such
powerful reason lies with the constraining effect of the public for all
elected judges-males and females. All elected judges, even those who
face uncontested retention elections, are likely to be mindful of the
public's preferences. 72 This also fits with the larger literature that finds
incumbent elected officials are still strongly "reelection minded" even
when the odds of losing reelection are slim. 7 3 While this literature has
not separately tested this effect for male and female politicians,
historical trends in those elected offices indicate that most of those
office holders were male. 74

68. Janis V. Sanchez-Hucles & Donald D. Davis, Women and Women of Color in Leadership:
Complexity, Identity, and Intersectionality, 65 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 171, 177 (2010).
69. Robert K. Christensen et al., Race and Gender Bias in Three Administrative Contexts:
Impact on Work Assignments in State Supreme Courts, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 625, 627
(2012).
70. Kira Sanbonmatsu, Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice, 46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 20, 22 (2002).
71. Monica Biernat & Diane Kobrynowicz, Gender- and Race-Based Standards of
Competence: Lower Minimum Standards but HigherAbility Standardsfor Devalued Groups, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 544, 554 (1997).
72. See, e.g., Traut & Emmert, supra note 48.
73. MAYHEW, supra note 49, at 37; Arnold, supra note 49, at 408-09.
74.

See, e.g., ROGER H. DAVIDSON ET AL., CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 68 (16th ed. 2017).
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Another reason not to expect a public opinion difference rests
with the above-described organizational theory.75 Organizational
theory expects that all judges, male and female, underwent the same
legal training and background experiences before receiving their
judgeships. Those things, rather than sex, are likely to affect behavior
and decisionmaking responsiveness for elected judges.
C. Data and Research Design
To test the effect of public opinion on trial judge behavior with a
specific focus on whether female and male trial judges respond
differently to that public opinion, we turn once again to Nelson's
Colorado data on trial judge behavior in issuing marijuana-related
criminal sentences in the 2000s. 76 Here, we focus specifically on
whether Colorado's 2006 marijuana legalization initiative results
affected male and female judges in distinct ways.
The Colorado general election ballot in 2006 included the
following initiative: the ballot asked, "Shall there be an amendment to
section 18-18-406 (1) of the Colorado revised statutes making legal the
possession of one ounce or less of marihuana for any person twenty-one
years of age or older?"7 7 The proposal failed (with 41% support).7 8
However, as depicted in Figure 2, county-level support for the measure
varied considerably.
We follow the same three-pronged approach to estimate
differences in the responsiveness of male and female judges. First, we
examine all sentences handed down by Colorado trial court judges,
using the sentence severity scale as the outcome variable for that model.
Second, we subset the data to felonies alone and model the amount of
incarceration time as the dependent variable. Finally, we look to petty
offenses, modeling the amount of the fine received by the defendant as
the dependent variable.
Because our concept of interest is differential responsiveness to
the initiative results by gender, the key independent variable is a threeway interaction between the gender of the judge, whether the sentence
was handed down before or after the initiative vote (Post-Initiative),
75. Kritzer & Uhlman, supra note 13, at 87.
76. Nelson, supra note 6, at 127-33.
77. Id. at 126; Official Publicationof the Abstract of Votes Cast for the 2005 Coordinated,2006
Primary,
2006
General,
ST.
COLO.
156,
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Abstract/pdf/2000-2099/2006AbsractBook.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5R4T-5YNK] [hereinafter Colorado Vote Summary].
78. Nelson, supra note 6, at 126. Participation and turnout were high. Nearly 98% of ballots
included a vote on the marijuana measure, and two-thirds of active Colorado voters turned out in
the election. Id.; Colorado Vote Summary, supra note 77, at 144, 163.
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and the results of the initiative (Initiative Support). Because the
initiative sought to legalize small amounts of marijuana, higher values
of this latter variable indicate more pro-marijuana views.
FIGURE 2: COLORADO COUNTY-LEVEL SUPPORT FOR MARIJUANA BASED
ON THE 2006 BALLOT MEASURE
Support for Marijuana, 2006 Election Results

7

0

15%-19.99%

o

2D%- 2. 99i

*

30%-49 99%

5D6%-59%

Like in our statistical modeling above, we continue to control for
other political and legal factors that may affect judicial sentencing
behavior. This includes the following previously discussed measures:
Constituent Ideology, Republican, severity of the offense, whether the
case was heard by a district or county court, and defendant
characteristics.
D. Findings
Table 3 displays the results of the analysis. Again, the three
columns in the table correspond to the three separate linear
regressions: the sentence severity scale for all charges, incarceration
time for felonies, and fines for petty offenses.
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TABLE 3: MODELING SENTENCE SEVERITY IN MARIJUANA CONVICTIONS,

COLORADO 2004-2005

Female Judge

Post-Initiative

Initiative Support

Initiative Support x Post-Initiative

Initiative Support x Female Judge

Post-Initiative x Female Judge

Initiative Support x
Post-Initiative x Female Judge
Republican Appointee

Constituent Ideology

District Court

Minority Defendant

Female Defendant

Defendant's Age

Misdemeanor

All
Sentences

Felonies

Petty
Offenses

0.20

4.35

0.76

(0.90)

(4.15)

(0.56)

1.42*

4.19*

1.30*

(0.36)

(2.08)

(0.18)

-0.05*

-0.10

0.00

(0.02)

(0.06)

(0.01)

-0.02

-0.09

-0.01*

(0.01)

(0.05)

(0.01)

0.00

-0.09

-0.01

(0.02)

(0.10)

(0.01)

-0.01

-3.40

-0.13

(0.62)

(4.02)

(0.29)

0.00

0.06

0.00

(0.01)

(0.10)

(0.01)

-0.66*

-0.47

-0.29*

(0.18)

(0.51)

(0.13)

0.04*

0.04

0.02*

(0.01)

(0.05)

(0.01)

0.04

8.45

-0.54*

(0.20)

(6.28)

(0.11)

0.27*

1.03*

-0.04

(0.09)

(0.40)

(0.05)

-0.05

-1.54*

0.09

(0.09)

(0.53)

(0.05)

0.00

0.04*

0.00

(0.00)

(0.02)

(0.00)

4.62

2.28*

-5.07*
(0.11)

Petty Offense

-8.67*
(0.16)

Constant

12.29*
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All
Sentences

Felonies

Petty
Offenses

(0.71)

(6.64)

(0.47)

OJudge

0.85

1.38

0.31

ODistrict

0.56

1.05

0.67

9,099

1,497

5,108

47547.62

9837.94

17379.42

N
BIC

Standard errors are in parentheses, and * indicates statistical significance at p<0.05.
Felonies are the baseline category in the first model (column 1).

With so many multiplicative interaction terms in the model, it is
easiest to understand the results of the analysis with a figure. Figure 3
displays the marginal effect of deciding a case after the initiative for
both male and female judges across the range of initiative support. Just
as Nelson previously showed,79 there is strong evidence that judges did,
on the whole, respond to the initiative by sentencing more punitively
overall (as evidenced by the positive and statistically significant
coefficients on Post-Initiative and the fact that the marginal effect is
positive and statistically significant for most values in the figure).8 0 The
fact that the marginal effect is downward sloping indicates that the
amount of responsiveness was less for judges whose constituents
supported the legalization of marijuana (the highest values of initiative
support) than for those judges whose constituents did not support the
measure (the lowest values of initiative support).
The second resounding conclusion from Figure 3 is the lack of a
difference between male and female judges in their response for the
initiative. In the table, the coefficient on the three-way multiplicative
interaction term does not reach statistical significance. This suggests
that the extent to which judges reflected issue-specific public opinion
(here, the support for the initiative) before and after the initiative does
not change based upon whether the judge is male or female. This is
easily confirmed in Figure 3: the two panels of the figure look nearly
identical.

79. Nelson, supra note 6, at 125, 128.
80. There is one slight difference from Nelson's finding as shown in Figure 3: there is evidence
that, using a linear model rather than a count model and controlling for the gender of the judge,
the judges with the most liberal constituencies did not change their behavior after the initiative.
Id. at 143-44.
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FIGURE 3: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF POST-INITIATIVE ON SENTENCE
SEVERITY, BY JUDGE GENDER
Male Judges

Female Judges
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The model estimates come from Model 1 in Table 3 and hold all other covariates at their
median (for interval-level variables) or modal (for categorical variables) values. The
figure demonstrates the lack of differential responsiveness to the public opinion signal
by the gender of the judge.

The control variables suggest similar conclusions to those drawn
earlier. Again, there is some evidence (albeit limited to felonies) that
female defendants receive lighter sentences (by about one year) while
nonwhite defendants appear to get harsher sentences overall and when
convicted of a felony. This corresponds to a 1.8-year increase in the
average incarceration time for a nonwhite defendant convicted of a
felony. Likewise, there is some evidence that judges in Colorado who
were appointed by Republican governors, all else equal, are less
punitive in their sentences.
CONCLUSION

As we noted at the outset of this project, because female judges
represent but a small fraction of U.S. trial judges, systematic judicial
behavior differences between male and female judges can have
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important implications for criminal defendants. As our empirical
findings reveal, this difference is born out in the data for one group of
defendants-namely females. In other words, our results indicate that
while male and female judges sentence male defendants equally
harshly, the sentences of female defendants differ based on the gender
of the judge. Compared to male defendants, female defendants are
sentenced significantly more leniently by female judges, while female
defendants tend to receive harsher sentences than a similarly situated
male defendant when a male judge is behind the bench. The intricacy
of these results may explain the hodgepodge state of the prior empirical
literature on the effects of judge gender on criminal sentencing: only by
examining the interactive effect of judge gender and defendant gender
does a difference emerge. Of course, this needs to be carefully tested for
in other trial court settings before we can attest to its generalizability.
By contrast, our results show no evidence that female and male
trial judges in Colorado respond differently to public opinion. While
some theories expected that, because of social stereotypes that question
female competence, female judges would be more likely to be cognizant
of and responsive to public opinion, it may well be that the perception
of vulnerability extends to all elected judges, regardless of their gender.
We hope to see the effects of public opinion on female elites further
tested in future empirical projects on other judicial and political
settings.
More generally, we believe that the continued empirical
evaluation of female and male judicial behavior is fruitful. There are
many other judicial decisionmaking opportunities that may yield
different outputs between male and female judges. These include, for
example, opinion writing, collegial interaction with fellow judges, oral
argument behavior, and trial court case management, including the
potential for active encouragement of settlement and plea bargaining.
Only by examining these different arenas of judicial behavior across
courts and time can we truly gain an understanding of the substantive
importance of diversifying the judiciary.

